ABSTRACT Highly efficient languages, such as C/C++, have low-level control over memory. Due to the lack of validity detection for pointers and garbage collection for memory, developers are responsible for dynamic memory management by explicitly allocating and deallocating memory. However, explicit memory management brings a large number of memory safety-related vulnerabilities, such as use-after-free. The threat of use-after-free vulnerabilities has become more and more serious due to their high level of the severity and quick emergence of the number. In this paper, a dynamic defense system is proposed against use-after-free exploits by introducing an approach based on multi-level pointers that insert intermediate pointers between a heap object and its related pointers. First, the relationship between a heap object to be protected, and the related pointers pointing to it, is established by combing with intermediate pointers. Then, all of the accesses to this object via its related pointers can only be achieved through these intermediate pointers. Finally, to prevent the dangling pointers from being dereferenced to this object, all the intermediate pointers related to this object are invalidated when it is freed so that any access to a freed object can be prevented due to the invalidated intermediate pointers. The prototype system MPChecker is implemented, which can prevent use-after-free exploits for C/C++ multi-threaded programs. Compared with the related methods, MPChecker can protect pointers that are copied in a type-unsafe way from being dereferenced to freed objects. In addition, it can also defend against dangling pointers located on the whole memory, including the stack, the heap, and global memory, rather than the heap only. The defense capability is proved by protecting against two exploits to a real-world program, comparing the support of type-unsafe copy with a self-written program. The performance evaluation of MPChecker with some benchmarks, multi-threaded programs, and real-world programs, shows its comparable efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many engines of applications (e.g., web servers, browsers, and databases) are implemented with highly efficient languages, such as C/C++, due to their low-level control over memory that enables high memory utilization and performance. However, C/C++ language does not have validity detection for pointers and is lack of garbage collection The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Zheng Yan. mechanism. These tasks are left to developers, who are responsible for dynamic memory management by explicitly allocating and deallocating memory. As we all know, explicit memory management brings a large number of memory safety-related vulnerabilities.
In general, memory error vulnerabilities can be categorized into two types: spatial error (e.g., out-of-bounds errors, uninitialized pointers dereferencing, invalid type conversion, and format string vulnerabilities) and temporal error (e.g., useafter-free, and double free). Dangling pointers [1] , which are pointers that do not point to a valid object of the appropriate type. A dangling pointer itself does not cause any memory safety problem, but accessing memory via a dangling pointer is the main reason for temporal error vulnerabilities, including use-after-free and double free.
A use-after-free vulnerability means that the memory of a deallocated (e.g., freed on the heap, popped out of the stack) object is accessed via a dangling pointer. Stack use-afterfree vulnerabilities are rare [2] and challenging to exploit [3] , which cannot be found in the CVE database. Therefore, we focus on heap use-after-free vulnerability in the rest of this paper.
For dynamic memory management, most of the memory allocators reuse the memory of a freed object to improve system efficiency, which makes the memory of the freed object likely be reallocated to another new object. In a use-after-free vulnerability, the dangling pointers of the freed object can still be dereferenced, thus the memory that only belongs to the new object can be accessed via those dangling pointers, which can result in serious problems such as information leakage (memory read) and arbitrary code execution (memory write).
Information leakage and arbitrary code execution can help attackers to increase their privileges. Therefore, use-afterfree vulnerabilities are severely dangerous. In recent ten years, 1 the number of use-after-free vulnerabilities in the NVD database has increased from 21 to 353, and 86.46% of them were rated as high or critical in terms of severity.
List. 1.
A snippet code with a use-after-free vulnerability.
Listing 1 shows the snippet code in Creolabs Gravity [4] version 1.0, which includes a use-after-free vulnerability as described in CVE-2017-1000172. The schematic of the snippet code in Listing 1 is shown in Fig. 1 . For easy understanding, all irrelevant code and parameters are ignored. In ''gravity_parser.c'', an object is allocated on the heap, and then the pointer sublexer points to this object at line 4. The pointer lexer also points to this object after executing line 5 and line 7, as shown in (a) of Fig. 1 . Then this object is freed via sublexer at line 8, as shown in (b) of Fig. 1 . However, in ''gravity_lexer.c'', the freed object is used via lexer in line 14, which is a use-after-free behavior, as shown in (c) of Fig. 1 . 1 The data is from 2009 to 2018. We can defend against an exploit to a use-after-free vulnerability during the runtime of a program, by aiming at three facts that the exploit depends on: (1) a pointer that becomes a dangling pointer once an object is freed, (2) a new object (usually related to the attacker) that is allocated on the same memory space of the lately freed object to speed up the object management by reusing this memory, (3) a control flow hijacking that will possibly occur by dereferencing the dangling pointer to access a manipulated function pointer. In addition, we can also detect use-after-free vulnerabilities in a program by using static analysis.
Some static analysis [5] , [6] approaches that aim at useafter-free vulnerabilities are based on pointer analysis (or value analysis). As we know, the effectiveness of pointer analysis (or value analysis) is affected by the accuracy of the resolving of pointers. However, static analysis cannot precisely resolve some pointers, and the points-to information of these pointers can only be determined at runtime because real-world programs are usually multi-threaded and interactive, which brings uncertainty to the points-to information of those pointers that are related to pointer propagation between threads, and interactive data. Therefore, static analysis usually has a high false negative rate or a high false positive rate for the detection of use-after-free vulnerabilities due to the inaccuracy of pointer analysis (or value analysis).
Safe memory allocators [7] - [9] can reduce the probability of revealing the exact location of reused memory from the perspective of the second fact mentioned above, by avoiding allocated objects from being placed at the same memory space as lately freed objects. However, these methods are not complete because attackers can still make the new object be placed on the lately freed memory through certain techniques, such as heap-spraying [10] and Heap Feng Shui [11] .
There are also protections against control flow hijacking from the perspective of the third fact mentioned above, such as control flow integrity (CFI) [12] and virtual table (VTable) hijacking protection [13] , [14] . However, a practical CFI [15] , [16] is usually coarse-grained, and not able to provide full protection against control flow hijacking because it only checks the indirect control transfer against a target set that includes a group of valid transfer instructions. Thus, it cannot defend against illegal control flow transfers that are deliberately manipulated with the targets inside this target set [17] , [18] . There are protections to defend against VTable hijacking [13] , [14] , which are only effective for protecting virtual function calls indexed by VTables, rather than for indirect control transfers in general.
To invalidate all dangling pointers related to a freed object (e.g., FreeSentry [2] , DangNULL [3] , and DangSan [19] ), which is a class of protections from the perspective of the first fact mentioned above, can help eliminate dangling pointers precisely, and thus provide a complete defense for use-afterfree exploits. When an object is freed, dangling pointers can be found by analyzing the relationship between the object and its related pointers during runtime. However, it is a challenging task to analyze this relationship without modifying the program's source code because for an object in a program, there could be many pointers pointing to it which are caused by pointer propagation, and the original program itself usually does not record the relationship between this object and its related pointers. Therefore, these protection methods typically require data structures, such as RB-tree [3] or map [2] , [19] , to record this relationship and maintain it dynamically. When an object is freed, all dangling pointers of this object will be set as invalid by using the relationship recorded in these data structures.
All of these methods [2] , [3] , [19] need to track pointer propagation during runtime to maintain the relationship dynamically. However, the tracking must base on the type information of pointers, which makes it not able to track pointers that are copied in a type-unsafe way where the type information of pointers cannot be obtained directly, such as memory copy functions (e.g., memcpy(), realloc()) and type-unsafe conversions.
In addition, all of the relationships between objects and its related pointers are placed in the same data structure [2] , [3] that has to be modified for any pointer-related propagation, which makes these methods not suitable for multithreaded programs where this single data structure needs to be locked, and thus the concurrency of programs will be affected. In general, there are still the following challenges to defend against use-after-free vulnerabilities: C1 How to provide a protection that cannot be bypassed easily, by offering a precise detection and a complete defense against use-after-free exploits. C2 How to trace all pointer propagation as many as possible, including pointers that are copied in a type-unsafe way. C3 How to improve practicability with high efficiency in memory-intensive programs. In this paper, to solve the three challenges presented above, we propose a dynamic defense system against use-after-free exploits by introducing an approach based on multi-level pointers that inserts intermediate pointers between a heap object (a pointer located on the heap is also treated as a heap object when it is accessed via a higher level pointer) and its related pointers, rather than using a specific data structure that records the relationship between objects and its related pointers [2] , [3] . Moreover, all of the accesses to this object via its related pointers can only be achieved through these intermediate pointers. Therefore, when this object is freed, we only need to invalidate related intermediate pointers, rather than find and invalidate all related pointers.
We implement a prototype called Multi-level Pointer Checker (MPChecker), to protect against useafter-free exploits for C/C++ multi-threaded programs. MPChecker can automatically generate intermediate pointers and maintain the new relationships between an object and intermediate pointers, as well as between intermediate pointers and its related pointers. In addition, MPChecker can track pointers that are copied in a type-unsafe way because type information of pointers is not needed. In general, we make the following contributions:
• We propose a complete defense against use-after-free exploits based on multi-level pointers, which tracks all pointers located on the whole memory dynamically and tracks all pointer propagation including the ones that a pointer is copied in a type-unsafe way.
• We implement MPChecker, a prototype system of the proposed method based on LLVM [20] , which is compatible with various platforms without the necessity to modify different implementations of memory allocators or kernels.
• We verify its capability by protecting against two exploits to a real-world program, comparing the support of type-unsafe copy with a self-written program. We also evaluate the performance of MPChecker with some benchmarks, real-world programs, and multi-threaded programs, which shows its comparable efficiency.
II. OVERVIEW
An overview of MPChecker is shown in Fig. 2 , which includes two phases: static instrumentation, runtime protection. In the static instrumentation phase (see Section III-A for details), the source code is compiled into LLVM intermediate representation (LLVM IR) [21] , and those instructions inside the LLVM IR which are related to pointers and objects are analyzed and replaced by LLVM pass [22] with a secured version in a self-implemented library. During runtime, for each secured version of instruction, in addition to achieving the functionality of original instruction, this secured version also provides functionalities to protect original one by monitoring the related object, tracking and checking related pointers. To overcome the challenge C1, we aim at eliminating dangling pointers dynamically. In MPChecker, the allocation of a VOLUME 7, 2019 heap object and the pointer propagation related to this object are tracked, and then intermediate pointers are generated if needed to maintain the relationship between this object and its related pointers. We name the intermediate pointer as the base-level pointer (basePtr). All of the accesses to a heap object must go through basePtrs. An object freeing operation will invalidate its related basePtrs. Thus, dangling pointers can be prevented from being dereferenced to access a freed object because all related basePtrs are invalidated.
The heap object manager (see Section III-B for details) is responsible for the allocations and deallocations of heap objects. For object allocations, an object and a corresponding list of basePtrs with one initial element will be created, then the relationship between them will be established. For object deallocations, the relationship between the object and the corresponding basePtr list will be broken, thereby, dangling pointers to this object can be eliminated. The basePtr list is a data structure that links all basePtrs related to an object together. For a heap object, multiple pointers could exist that point to this object's address range, which results in dangling pointers that point to the address range rather than the starting address of this object only. Thus, it is needed to maintain a list of basePtrs for all the pointers that point to the address range.
To overcome the challenge C2, all of the propagated pointers can be protected as long as the accesses to heap objects by dereferencing these pointers are through basePtrs. As we know, there are two ways for pointers to be propagated, i.e., through the direct copy, and through pointer arithmetic. The pointer tracker (see Section III-C for details) is responsible for tracing the propagation through pointer arithmetic at runtime. For the propagation through the direct copy (e.g., p2 = p1), the pointer tracker is not needed because the value of p1 is the address of a basePtr that can be directly assigned to p2 by the original assignment instruction, without the necessity to maintain a separate basePtr for p2 by the pointer tracker. For the propagation through pointer arithmetic (e.g., p4 = p3 + 1), if the pointer tracker cannot find a basePtr that points to the calculated address (p4) from corresponding basePtr list, a new basePtr will be generated and linked into the basePtr list of the related object. In addition, for pointers that are copied in a type-unsafe way, the pointer tracker is also not needed because the situation is the same as the propagation through the direct copy where it is not necessary to maintain a separate basePtr.
To overcome the challenge C3, instead of using the same data structure to record all relationships between objects and their related pointers [2] , [3] , MPChecker only needs to make all pointers related to a heap object point to corresponding basePtrs in a basePtr list. Each object has a unique basePtr list. When an object is freed, it is only needed to invalidate all basePtrs in the related basePtr list. Moreover, each basePtr list is independent of each other, which makes the probability of lock waiting decrease, so that the concurrency of multi-threaded programs will not be significantly affected. In addition, instead of tracing all pointer propagation using additional tracking modules which brings extra overhead [2] , [3] , [19] , MPChecker only needs to trace the pointer propagation through pointer arithmetic.
III. DESIGN
In this section, we explain the design of MPChecker. We discuss each of the components in Fig. 2 and the relationship between them. The optimization that has been made for those components is also discussed.
A. STATIC INSTRUMENTATION
The main goal of the static instrumentation is to insert some tracking code into the code related to pointers of the program. The pointers located on the stack or in global memory can also point to a heap object, which could also bring use-afterfree vulnerabilities. Thus, only tracking the pointers on the heap, such as DangNULL [3] does, could result in a high false negative. In MPChecker, all the pointers on the whole memory, including the heap, the stack, and global memory, are monitored. Thus, all the places related to pointers in the program will be instrumented and replaced at the static instrumentation phase.
In MPChecker, the source code of a program is supposed to be compiled into LLVM IR that retains the type of variables and the function calls, which makes it more convenient and accurate to locate the instructions related to objects and pointers inside LLVM IR during the static instrumentation phase. For these LLVM IR instructions related to objects and pointers, the original ones need to be instrumented and replaced with the secured version of instructions from the self-implemented library that will protect the relevant objects during runtime. The instructions to be instrumented and replaced are as follows: heap object allocations, pointer dereferences, pointer propagation through pointer arithmetic, function calls, and heap object deallocations. The instrumented instructions of the program together with the self-implemented library are then compiled into the secured binary. It is worth mentioning that closed source programs cannot be protected by MPChecker due to the requirement of source code for LLVM compilation.
All the instructions that are supposed to be instrumented and replaced can be found by analyzing the meaning of instructions and their operands. Listing 2 shows instrumented examples for different operations, with actual instrumentation being processed at LLVM instruction level. The original operations are commented, while the corresponding instrumented operations are shown beside.
For two function calls malloc() and free() that provide heap allocation and deallocation, the instructions of these function calls retains the function names which can be used to find the function calls themselves accordingly. Then, these two function calls (malloc() and free()) are replaced with function calls secMPMalloc() and
List. 2. Examples for instructions to be instrumented.
secMPFree() which are provided by the heap object manager. For example, malloc(sizeof(Obj)) in line 2 and free(p1) in line 36 are replaced with secMPMalloc(sizeof(Obj)) in line 5 and secMPFree(p1) in line 38 respectively. Because all heap object allocation/deallocation functions and operators, such as realloc(), new, and delete, are implemented by encapsulating either malloc() or free(), we only need to instrument and replace function calls malloc() and free() inside those heap object allocations/deallocations functions or operators.
For pointer dereferences, because type information of pointers is retained, all instructions of pointer dereferences can be found by searching the instruction load 2 whose operand is a pointer. Since the values of all pointers that originally pointed to the heap objects have been changed to addresses of basePtrs, directly dereferencing these pointers will reach basePtrs rather than objects themselves. Therefore, we need to distinguish pointers with and without basePtrs in order to handle them differentially when dereferencing. The pointer checking process (ptrCheck()) is responsible for distinguishing pointers before dereferencing. For example, * p2 and * p1 in line 10 need to be instrumented and replaced with * ptrCheck(p2) and * ptrCheck(p1) in line 11 to dereference pointers. 2 In LLVM IR, the 'load' instruction is used to read from memory.
For pointer propagation through pointer arithmetic, a sequence of instructions, load, getelementptr 3 , and store 4 , distinguishably compose this kind of propagation, and thus can be regarded as identifying accordance. This sequence of instructions is instrumented and replaced with a function call getMPPtr() which is provided by the pointer tracker. This function has two parameters, the first one is the value of the pointer in the arithmetic expression, and the second one is the object's address that is calculated after pointer arithmetic (see Section III-C for details). For example, the statement j1 = p1 in line 14 does not need any modification, as shown in line 21. On the other hand, q1 = (char * )p1 + 10 in line 18 is instrumented and replaced with q1 = getMPPtr(p1, ptrCheck(p1)+10), as shown in line 25.
For general function calls, it should be noted that the address of a basePtr cannot be passed to the third-party libraries (or kernels) because the third-party libraries (or kernels) cannot deal with the basePtrs correctly. Therefore, function calls of third-party libraries (or kernels) with a pointer argument need to be handled specially. By recording all the local functions of a program before instrumenting, the external functions from third-party libraries can be excluded and processed distinctively when instrumenting. For an external function that includes a pointer as an argument, the ptrCheck() will be added to this argument, which ensures that the value of this argument is the address of an object rather than the address of a basePtr. For example, localFun(p1) in line 30 is a local function and libraryFun(p1) in line 31 is a library function, libraryFun(p1) is instrumented and replaced with libraryFun(ptrCheck(p1)) after adding ptrCheck() to p1, as shown in line 33.
However, similar to the related methods [2] , [3] , [19] , the third-party libraries (or kernels) cannot be protected by MPChecker because of the necessity of recompilation caused by the LLVM instrumentation and the replacement of pointerrelated instructions.
B. HEAP OBJECT MANAGER
The main goal of the heap object manager is to create/delete heap objects, and correspondingly initialize/invalidate the basePtr list. The heap object manager mainly includes two parts of functionalities: object allocation management, and object deallocation management, as shown in Fig. 3 .
For the allocation of a heap object, firstly, a basePtr named basePtrH is allocated as the head node of the basePtr list corresponding to the object that will be created. Secondly, the object1 is created. The basePtrH and the object1 are both allocated on the heap through malloc(). Finally, the basePtrH points to the object1, which establishes the relationship between the basePtrH and the object1. After these steps, the heap object manager returns the address of the basePtrH rather than the address of the object1 itself.
It is worth mentioning that when a pointer is dereferenced, it is needed to distinguish the pointer points to a basePtr or an object1. We provide the distinguishing capability by flagging the address of a basePtr. For the address space of a 64-bit Linux system, only the lower 48 bits are used, while the higher 16 bits are not used, no matter the user space or the kernel space. Thus, in MPChecker, we use the highest one of these unused bits as a flag to mark whether the address is basePtr or not.
The flag bit of an address is then consumed by the pointer checking process (ptrcheck()) which is responsible for obtaining the actual address of an object. Listing 3 shows an example of the pointer checking process. If an address (e.g., the value of p) is flagged, the lower 48-bit of this address will be dereferenced to reach the corresponding basePtr which stores the actual object's address, and then this actual address will be returned, as shown in line 3. Otherwise, this address is returned directly, as shown in line 5. In real-world programs, there are many places where it is needed to obtain the actual address of an object, including pointer dereferences, and external function calls with a pointer argument. Therefore, the pointer checking process is implemented with an inline function to reduce the overhead caused by function calls when it is implemented with a normal function.
For the deallocation of a heap object, all basePtrs (e.g., basePtrH and basePtr1 in Fig. 3 ) in the basePtr list corresponding to a heap object are invalidated, and then this heap object is freed. The deletion of the object itself has to be done after the invalidation of all basePtrs, so as to prevent the concurrent access to this object through a basePtr that has not been invalidated in the step of invalidating this basePtr list.
It is worth mentioning that because the life cycle of dangling pointers is not recorded in MPChecker, we have to assume that the life cycle of a dangling pointer extends until the program is finished. Therefore, all invalid basePtrs are reserved until the program is finished to make sure any access to a freed object goes through a basePtr. Although basePtrs are allocated on the heap, basePtrs themselves will not cause use-after-free problems because they are not freed until the program is finished.
C. POINTER TRACKER
The main goal of the pointer tracker is to trace the pointer propagation through pointer arithmetic. The pointer tracker will create and insert new basePtrs to the corresponding basePtr list, as shown in Fig. 4 . To explain how to track the pointers propagated through pointer arithmetic, such as q1 = (char * )p1 + 10 and q2 = (char * )p2 + 10 in Fig. 4 If the BasePtr exists, OriginPtrValue/ NewPtrValue will be the address of OriginBasePtr/ NewBasePtr, and the value of OriginBasePtr/ NewBasePtr itself will be OriginObjAddr/ NewObjAddr. Otherwise, OriginPtrValue/NewValue itself will be OriginObjAddr/NewObjAddr.
For a statement of pointer propagation through pointer arithmetic p = q + m (p, q are pointers, m is an integer), which is instrumented and replaced with p = getMPPtr(q, ptrCheck(q) + m), as mentioned in Section III-A. The first argument is OriginPtrValue, which will be determined whether itself is the address of the OriginBasePtr. The second argument is NewObjAddr, which is obtained by calculating ptrCheck(q) + m. The function getMPPtr is shown as Algorithm 1. The propagated pointers that are copied directly, such as j1 in Fig. 4 , can still be protected without the pointer tracker, as discussed in Section II. Moreover, this kind of propagated pointers also include the pointers that are copied in a type-unsafe way, such as memory copy functions (e.g., memcpy(ptrCheck(m11), &p1, sizeof(p1)) in Fig. 4) , and type-unsafe conversions (e.g., j2 = (Obj * )(long)p2 in Fig. 4 ). With MPChecker, after executing any statement of direct copy, the pointer (e.g., j1 in Fig. 4 ) still points to the basePtr (e.g., basePtrH in Fig. 4) , which means it is still protected.
Algorithm 1 The Algorithm for getMPPtr

D. BASEPTR LIST
The goal of the basePtr list includes the following two aspects. Firstly, it maintains the relationship between a heap object and its related pointers. Secondly, it effectively prevents the pointers related to a freed object from being dereferenced to this object.
A basePtr list can contain multiple basePtr nodes, with each basePtr node including three elements: basePtr, prevNode, and nextNode, as shown in Fig. 5 . The basePtr is a pointer pointing to an address of the heap object, the prevNode holds the address of the previous basePtr node, and the nextNode holds the address of the next basePtr node. In a basePtr list, each basePtr stores a unique address which is in the corresponding object's address range, and all basePtr nodes are sorted according to the addresses that are stored in themselves.
One goal of the basePtr list is to maintain the relationship between a heap object and its related pointers. In order to make sure that any access to an object via a pointer goes through a basePtr, each related pointer must point to a basePtr in the corresponding basePtr list.
If the memory leak is not considered, there will be at least one pointer that points to a heap object. Thus, a basePtr list corresponding to an object will have at least one basePtr as the head node. Furthermore, the number of nodes in a basePtr list is determined by the original relationship between an object and its related pointers. One basePtr in a basePtr list is corresponding to a unique address in the object's address range, with the head node basePtrH pointing to the starting address of this object. The head node (basePtrH) in the basePtr list is created by the heap object manager, while the other nodes are created by the pointer tracker.
The other goal of the basePtr list is to prevent related dangling pointers from being dereferenced to a freed object. There are two modes when invalidating a basePtr list, the normal mode that sets all basePtrs to NULL, and the debug mode that inverts the second high bit of all basePtrs. A use-after-free exploit is normally enabled through dereferencing a dangling pointer to access a freed object. Instead, with the existence of basePtrs in MPChecker, this kind of exploit needs to dereference a basePtr. However, dereferencing a basePtr that has been invalidated in either mode will cause a segment fault, thus offering an effective prevention capability against any use-after-free exploit. In addition, the value of an inverted basePtr that is dereferenced can be shown in the debug mode. Thus, developers can find out which pointer is manipulated to exploit a use-after-free vulnerability, so as to analyze this exploit in more details.
For multi-threaded programs, a basePtr list could be accessed and modified by multiple threads of the same process. Thus, the lock mechanism is required to ensure the consistency of the basePtr list when it is being accessed, which can be achieved by locking the whole basePtr list. However, there could be a large number of pointer dereferences in a program, which results in a significant overhead if each dereference needs a locking and an unlocking operation to the whole basePtr list. Alternatively, we only apply the lock to all the prevNode and the nextNode elements in the basePtr list, while keeping all the basePtr elements lock-free, as shown in Fig. 6 . Keeping the basePtr element lock-free will cause the inconsistency when the basePtr list is being invalidated concurrently, which includes the following two situations. One situation is that different threads free the same object concurrently, while the other situation is that one thread frees an object when the other thread accesses basePtr element related to this object. For the first situation, we use a mutex constraint to ensure that the deallocation of the same heap object is mutually exclusive, so that a heap object cannot be freed by different threads concurrently. For the second situation, because the object related to this basePtr must be freed after all basePtr nodes in the basePtr list related to this object being invalidated, as discussed in Section III-B, use-after-free behavior will never happen. Fig. 6 shows an example of the second situation. In thread2, basePtr1 is about to be invalidated right after basePtrH in the previous node being invalidated. Meanwhile, there is a pointer dereference * ptrCheck(q1) in thread1. Thus, three kinds of concurrency ((a), (b), and (c) in Fig. 6 ) could happen. The object1 can only be accessed for (a), while it cannot be accessed for (b) and (c) because the related basePtr1 has already been invalidated. The access that happens in (a) will not cause any use-after-free behavior because object1
has not yet been freed at this moment.
However, similar to the related methods [2] , [3] , [19] that cannot defend against dangling pointers which are stored in registers, MPChecker also cannot prevent from accessing the freed object via the valid value of basePtr element that is stored in a register even if a lock is applied to this basePtr element.
It is worth mentioning that DangDone [23] is a method to defend against dangling pointers based on intermediate pointers which are similar to the basePtrs in MPChecker. However, the design of DangDone is different with MPChecker. In DangDone, only one-level pointers are protected by modifying them into two-level pointers. Instead, in MPChecker, it is only needed to insert a basePtr between a heap object (or a pointer on the heap) and the pointer pointing to it, thus no need to restrict the level of pointers.
In addition, in DangDone, when a pointer is dereferenced, the original one-level pointer, no matter the stack or the heap object that it points to, is cast to a two-level pointer with an additional dereference when the program is compiled. However, processing pointers that point to the stack with intermediate pointers only provides a consistent way as processing pointers that point to the heap, while not bringing any protection for the pointers that point to the stack because the lifetime of intermediate pointers is essentially as ephemeral as the objects on the stack. Instead, in MPChecker, the pointer dereferences are dynamically achieved through * ptrCheck(), which can deterministically dereference pointers with or without basePtr during runtime of the program. Meanwhile, the basePtr is only for the object on the heap, rather than for the object on the stack.
Use-after-free exploits cannot be defended by DangDone in the following cases. In DangDone, it is claimed that pointers with two or more levels will not become dangling pointers if the corresponding one-level pointers are protected.
However, the claim is not correct, because a two-level pointer (e.g., m11 in Fig. 5 ) that points to a one-level pointer (e.g., m1 in Fig. 5 ) on the heap can also become a dangling pointer even if this one-level pointer (e.g., m1) is protected. Instead, in MPChecker, there is also a basePtr (e.g., basePtrH2 in Fig. 5) between a two-level pointer (e.g., m11) and a onelevel pointer (e.g., m1) on the heap, which will prevent this one-level pointer (e.g., m1) from being accessed via this twolevel pointer (e.g., m11) after this one-level pointer (e.g., m1) is freed.
In addition, in DangDone, each object only has one intermediate pointer, which is similar to basePtrH (the head node in the basePtr list) in MPChecker. However, DangDone can only defend against dangling pointers that point to the starting address of an object, rather than the pointers that point to an address inside the address range of it. Instead, in MPChecker, the pointers (e.g., q1 and k1 in Fig. 5 ) that originally point to an address inside the address range of the object can also be protected because these pointers also point to the corresponding basePtrs (e.g., basePtr1 and basePtr2 in Fig. 5 ). In general, DangDone can only defend against one-level dangling pointers that point to the starting address of the heap object from use-after-free exploits.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
We implement a prototype system of MPChecker to protect against use-after-free exploits, which supports multi-threaded C/C++ programs. For the static instrumentation phase, we implement two LLVM passes, the first one is for recording all the local functions of a program and declaring the functions in the self-implemented library, which is for the preparation of instrumentation. The second one is for instrumenting and replacing the instructions. These two passes are made into LLVM compiler extension plugin. For the runtime protection, all functions inside the self-implemented library are implemented by C/C++, among which one function (getMPPtr()) is used for the pointer tracker, and 16 different secured functions (e.g., malloc(), free(), realloc(), new, and delete) are used for the heap object manager. In addition, with MPChecker, for any overloaded operator related to allocation/deallocation, it is easy to provide a secured version of this operator by replacing the malloc()/free() functions encapsulated inside itself with the secured ones. We compile the self-implemented library into a static shared library via LLVM.
In MPChecker, the program to be protected can run with native libraries, rather than requiring the customized libraries [19] or kernel modules [24] , thus offering the platformindependency. As long as the source of the program can be compiled into a target program by LLVM, the program can be protected by MPChecker without any other requirement, such as specific libraries or kernel modules. In addition, MPChecker does not modify the backend part of LLVM when the program is compiled. Thus, all compiler optimization is achieved according to the default optimization strategy. In general, for a program that needs to be protected by MPChecker, we only needs to use the compiler extension plugin and link the static shared library into the target file when compiling this program.
V. EVALUATION
We evaluate MPChecker from several aspects, including security, performance, scalability on multi-threaded programs, and memory consumption. In our evaluation, all evaluation programs are compiled by Clang 3.8 [20] . We run all evaluation programs on the 64-bit Ubuntu 16.04 system with the Intel Xeon E3-1230 v6 3.50 GHz CPU (4 cores) and 16 GB RAM. First, we evaluate the security of MPChecker, including the effectiveness, support of type-unsafe copy, and the coverage of objects and pointer-related operations. Next, we compare MPChecker to the baseline that has no modification to evaluation programs for evaluating MPChecker on the performance overhead, the scalability on multi-threaded programs, and the memory consumption.
A. SECURITY EVALUATION
To evaluate the defensive capabilities of MPChecker, we use a real-world vulnerability to show its effectiveness, then use a self-written program to show its support for type-unsafe copy, and finally give the coverage of objects and statistics about MPChecker itself for SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite.
1) EFFECTIVENESS
We test the defense capability of MPChecker with a realworld program that includes a use-after-free and a double free vulnerability in HCTF 2016 [25] , in the normal mode and the debug mode, respectively. In this program, heap objects can be dynamically created and deleted according to user input. However, after an object is freed, the pointer pointing to this object is not set to NULL. This can cause use-after-free and double free.
For the use-after-free exploit, the program crashes directly to prevent use-after-free behavior because an invalid basePtr is dereferenced, in both the normal mode and the debug mode. In the normal mode, if an invalid basePtr (NULL) is dereferenced, the debugging information will be shown as Fig. 7 . In the debug mode, the specific address that triggers the use-after-free behavior can be viewed from debugging information because the second high bit of this address is inverted. If an invalid basePtr (the higher 16 bits is 0 × 4000) is dereferenced, the debugging information will be shown as Fig. 8 .
For the double free exploit, in the normal mode, the corresponding basePtr is NULL, while free(NULL) does not cause any double free behavior. Thus, the program will continue running without any double free behavior. In the debug mode, the corresponding basePtr is an address with an inverted bit, which means the address is illegal, and the free() to this address will aim at an object that does not exist. Thus, the program will also crash directly to prevent double free behavior. Moreover, in the debug mode, the specific address that triggers a double free behavior can also be VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 7. A use-after-free exploit is prevented in the normal mode.
FIGURE 8.
A use-after-free exploit is prevented in the debug mode. viewed from debugging information. If an inverted address is passed to free(), the debugging information will be shown as Fig. 9 .
In general, the program crashes because an inverted address (or NULL) is dereferenced, which means that a useafter-free behavior can be effectively defended. In addition, the program crashes because an inverted address is used to free an object, which means that a double free behavior can also be effectively defended.
2) SUPPORT OF TYPE-UNSAFE COPY
In addition, we test the defense capability for dangling pointers that are stored on different locations, including the stack, the heap, and global memory, as well as pointers that are copied in a type-unsafe way, in a self-written program by comparing MPChecker and DangSan [19] . As shown in Fig. 10 , in the self-written program, stackPtr, heapPtr, and globalPtr are pointers on the stack, the heap, and global memory, respectively, while memcpyPtr and castPtr are pointers that are copied with memory copy function and type-unsafe conversions. The values of these pointers before and after the object related to them is freed are printed.
For pointers on the heap and global memory, both MPChecker and DangSan [19] can provide defense capability, either by setting the pointers to NULL in MPChecker or by inverting the highest bit of the pointers in DangSan. However, for pointers that are copied in a type-unsafe way, including the copies with memory copy function and with type-unsafe conversions, DangSan cannot provide defense capability because the values of the pointers are the same as before the object is freed, while MPChecker can provide full defense capability for these two types of dangling pointers.
It is worth mentioning that it is found that DangSan cannot protect the pointers on the stack (i.e., stackPtr). We try to modify the source code of DangSan to track the operations of saving heap addresses to pointers on the stack. However, some of the operations cannot be tracked, because DangSan is implemented based on link time optimization (LTO), and thus many of LLVM IR instructions that save heap addresses to pointers on the stack are deleted because of the optimization. In general, many pointers on the stack that are optimized cannot be protected by DangSan.
3) COVERAGE AND STATISTICS
We evaluate the coverage of objects and pointer-related operations in MPChecker on the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite [26] . As shown in Table 1 , the number of the objects allocated on the heap that is tracked and protected by heap object manager is shown as #alloc. The number of the pointer dereferences is shown as #deref, and the number of pointer dereferences that are protected is shown as #protect which means that the access to a heap object goes through a basePtr. For example, for the gobmk benchmark, there are 16 thousand heap objects (#alloc). In addition, there are 728 million pointer dereferences (#deref), among which 388 million pointer dereferences that access heap objects are protected (#protect), while the rest of the pointer dereferences do not access any heap object and thus are not needed to protect.
The number of pointer propagation through pointer arithmetic is shown as #propa, among which all of the pointer propagation related to the heap is traced and shown as #trace. For example, for gobmk, there are 13 million pointer propagation through pointer arithmetic (#propa), which contains 80 pointer propagation that are related to the heap and traced (#trace). For some benchmark programs, such as bzip2, hmmer, and sjeng, there is no traced pointer propagation, which means that all the propagation are related to the stack or global memory, rather than related to the heap.
In addition, we also evaluate the statistics about MPChecker itself. The number of basePtr nodes is shown as #BP, and the number of basePtr nodes that are invalidated is shown as #invalBP. In theory, #BP should be the same as #invalBP. However, for some benchmark programs, such as bzip2, milc, and sphinx3, #invalBP is less than #BP. The reason for this result is likely because the number of deallocation is less than the number of allocation in these programs according to our measurement.
We also try to compare MPChecker to DangNull [3] . In DangNULL, the number of heap objects that are tracked, the number of pointers that are tracked, and the number of pointers that are invalidated, are shown as #alloc, #ptrs, #invalPtrs, respectively, as shown in Table 1 . In MPChecker, the data #alloc is directly comparable with the #alloc in DangNULL. However, there is no data #ptrs and #invalPtrs in MPChecker that can be directly compared to DangNULL for the following two reasons. First, the pointers that are directly copied (including the copy in a type-unsafe way) are not tracked in MPChecker, which makes it impossible to accurately count the number of pointers (i.e., #ptrs) that are tracked in a program. Second, in MPChecker, the basePtr nodes instead of the pointers themselves are invalidated, which makes it unnecessary to count the data #invalPtrs.
The defense capability against use-after-free behavior can be evaluated through #ptrs and #invalPtrs in DangNULL because these two data show the coverage of pointers that are prevented from becoming dangling pointers. Instead, it can also be evaluated through #protect and #invalBP in MPChecker because these two data show the coverage of pointer dereferences that are prevented from dereferencing through dangling pointers.
As shown in Table 1 , for the coverage of objects (#alloc), MPChecker tracks much more objects than DangNULL in all benchmark programs except lbm (with the same number of objects), which means that MPChecker can provide protection for more heap objects than DangNULL. For the defense capability, DangNULL does not track (#ptrs) and invalidate (#invalPtrs) any pointer in 9 benchmarks programs, which means that there is no defense against dangling pointers in those programs. On the other hand, MPChecker protects the massive amount of pointer dereferences (#protect) from accessing heap objects, and invalidates basePtr nodes (#invalBP) in all programs. In general, MPChecker can provide better protection than DangNULL.
B. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate the performance overhead of MPChecker, we use the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark, the UnixBench [27] benchmark, and some real-world programs. We measure the performance overhead by comparing the running time of each program between a version protected by MPChecker and a baseline version without any modification.
1) THE SPEC CPU2006 BENCHMARK
The performance overhead for the C/C++ programs of SPEC CPU2006 is shown in Fig. 11, by comparing the results   FIGURE 11 . Performance overhead on SPEC CPU2006. of MPChecker with the results reported by FreeSentry [2] , DangNULL [3] , DangSan [19] , and Oscar [24] . Oscar is a safe memory allocator that can prevent use-after-free exploits with competitive performance. All the results compared are estimated from the graph in the related papers. The ordinate in Fig. 11 shows the ratio of running time between each defense system and baseline.
The average ratio of running time between baseline and MPChecker for SPEC CPU2006 is 1.62, which means that the performance slowdown is 62%. In comparison, the average performance slowdown of Oscar, DangSan, DangNULL, and FreeSentry, are 28%, 33%, 50%, 45%, respectively.
For those benchmark programs that present uncompetitive performance, such as bzip2, milc, namd, hmmer, and lbm, we conclude that it is due to a large number of pointer checking process caused by pointer dereferences (see #deref in Table 1 ) which is needed for every pointer to determine whether it points to a basePtr. We evaluate the percentage of the overhead of pointer checking process in the whole overhead caused by MPChecker. As shown in Fig. 12 , the pointer checking process occupies an average overhead of 24% for the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark. We believe that if the influence of the pointer checking process is excluded, the performance of MPChecker will be competitive with the related methods. We take how to optimize the performance of the pointer checking process as one of the future work.
However, for those benchmark programs that have many heap objects and are memory-sensitive, such as perlbench, soplex, and povray, the overhead of MPChecker is better than FreeSentry or DangNULL.
2) THE UNIXBENCH BENCHMARK AND REAL-WORLD PROGRAMS
We also evaluate the performance of MPChecker with UnixBench and some real-world programs. As shown in Fig. 13 , the ordinate is the score of the UnixBench evaluation, with the higher scores indicating better performance. Compared to the baseline, the average single-core performance overhead of MPChecker is 3.9%, and multi-core performance overhead is 3.2%. In addition, as shown in Fig. 14 , the performance overhead of these five real-world programs is within the range of 2.1%-68.31% and the average performance overhead for these real-world programs is 27.57%. 
3) DYNAMIC MEMORY ALLOCATIONS AND DEALLOCATIONS
For memory-sensitive programs, the scale of dynamic memory allocations and deallocations can be significantly large. Thus, we evaluate the performance of MPChecker by using a self-written program that has a large number of dynamic memory operations. In the program, heap objects are allocated and deallocated via malloc() and free(), and the size of each object varies from 1 Byte to 4 MB. We evaluate the running time of this self-written program with the different number of malloc() and free(), and compare the results between a version protected by MPChecker and a baseline version without any modification.
We also compare MPChecker to Oscar [24] which is one of the methods with the best performance. In Oscar, each function call of malloc()/free() is implemented as a system call to make each new object on a new virtual page, which can prevent dangling pointers related to a freed object from being dereferenced to this new object, thus avoiding the exploit of dangling pointers. It is found that the overhead of dynamic memory allocations and deallocations is proportional to the number of malloc()/free() in the program. Thus, a linear regression function (y = 1.1091x) is concluded in Oscar to predict the overhead of dynamic memory allocations and deallocations for programs with a various number of malloc()/free().
Due to the unavailability of Oscar system, we directly use the evaluation results from the paper [24] . In order to present the performance comparison in an equivalent way, we also modify the above self-written program to make each function call of malloc()/free() be implemented with the system call, the same as Oscar does. In general, as shown in Fig. 15 , similar to the results in Oscar, the linear regression relationship between the running time and the number of malloc() and free() also applies to all of the evaluation results for the three variants of the selfwritten program, including the baseline version, the version protected by MPChecker, and the version implemented with the system call, with the actual linear regression relationship as y = 0.0281x, y = 0.0706x, and y = 0.8696x, respectively. Compared to the baseline version, the overhead of the version protected by MPChecker and the version implemented with the system call is 3.51x and 31.95x.
Thus, the approach proposed in Oscar that makes each function call of malloc()/free() as a system call causes a significant performance overhead, especially when a large amount of malloc()/free() exist. We conclude that MPChecker presents a more competitive performance than Oscar for programs in which a large number of heap objects are allocated/deallocated. For example, as shown in Fig. 11 , for the benchmark perlbench, MPChecker gives better performance than Oscar, because there are 21M objects allocated in this program, as shown in Table 1 .
C. SCALABILITY ON MULTI-THREADED PROGRAMS
We use PARSEC [28] 3.0 to evaluate the scalability of MPChecker with multi-threaded programs. Since the evaluation machine is equipped with a 4-core CPU, and each core has 2-thread hyperthreading (8-thread hyperthreading in total), the running time of benchmark program will no longer decrease after the number of threads reached to 8. Thus, we set the maximum number of threads for evaluation as 16 .
We compare the running time between MPChecker and the baseline. As shown in Fig. 16 , the average overhead for all the four multi-threaded programs with all the various threads counted is 58.2% in MPChecker. In detail, the average overhead for these multi-threaded programs with a single thread is 55.05%, and remains within the range of 56.85%-64.6% with 2-16 threads. As the number of threads increases, MPChecker does not bring significant overhead. Although we lock the basePtr list, the lock is only applied to the prevNode and the nextNode elements while the basePtr element is kept lock-free. Moreover, each basePtr list is independent of each other, which makes the probability of lock waiting decrease.
D. MEMORY EVALUATION
To evaluate the memory consumption of MPChecker, we use the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark and the PARSEC benchmark. We measure the memory consumption by comparing the memory usage of the program between a version protected by MPChecker and a baseline version without any modification.
1) THE SPEC CPU2006 BENCHMARK
The memory consumption for the C/C++ programs of the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark is shown in Fig. 17 . Since no memory evaluation result is given in FreeSentry [2] , we only compare MPChecker with DangNULL [3] , DangSan [19] , and Oscar [24] . All the results compared are estimated from the graph in the related papers. The ordinate in Fig. 17 shows the ratio of memory usage between each defense system and the baseline. The average memory consumption for the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks in MPChecker, DangNULL, DangSan, and Oscar are 2.06x, 3.69x, 2.09x, and 1.58x, respectively.
For some benchmark programs that have few heap objects, such as bzip2, sjeng, libquantum, and lbm, MPChecker has memory consumption as low as that in DangNULL and DangSan. Moreover, for memory-sensitive programs, such as perlbench, hmmer, and astar, the memory consumption of MPChecker is lower than DangNULL. MPChecker does not add extra memory consumption for the programs that have no heap objects because the basePtr list is only generated for the heap objects. 
2) MULTI-THREADED PROGRAMS
We compare the memory consumption on multi-threaded programs between MPChecker and the baseline as shown in Fig. 18 . The average overhead for all the four multithreaded programs with all the various threads counted is 42.61% in MPChecker. In detail, the average overhead for these multi-threaded programs with a single thread is 42.74%, and remains within the range of 42.59%-42.74% with 2-16 threads. As the number of threads increases, MPChecker does not bring extra memory consumption because there are no extra data structures for each thread. Thus, there is almost no extra memory consumption for multithreading in MPChecker.
As discussed in Section III-B, all invalid basePtrs are reserved until the program is finished. If the program needs to run for a long time and has a large number of basePtrs, the memory consumption will increase. However, the evaluation result of memory consumption shows that the memory overhead is acceptable, with the value of 2.06x.
VI. RELATED WORK
There are many types of methods to defend against useafter-free exploits, including static analysis, dangling pointer invalidation, pointer dereference checking, safe memory allocators, and limiting the damage from exploits. In this section, we discuss each type of these methods.
A. STATIC ANALYSIS
Static analysis can be used to detect use-after-free vulnerabilities, which requires an accurate analysis of whether a dangling pointer will be used after being generated.
GUEB [6] is a method based on static analysis of binary codes to detect use-after-free vulnerabilities, which builds an abstract memory model and uses value analysis to extract subgraphs for each use-after-free vulnerability. PPDdetector [29] is a formal detection method based on first-order logic, which can detect most types of software vulnerabilities. CRED [5] is a recent method based on pointer analysis to find use-after-free vulnerabilities in C code, which utilizes path-sensitivity for pointer analysis to reduce false positives. Among the above methods, only CRED can be applied to large-scale programs due to the context reduction technique proposed to scale down the exponential number of contexts.
However, to detect use-after-free vulnerabilities with static analysis requires accurate analysis about reachability across all possible inter-procedure paths and the points-to information between pointers and objects, which is challenging to achieve with purely static methods, especially for large-scale programs. Therefore, static analysis methods for use-afterfree usually have high false negatives and high false positives.
B. DANGLING POINTER INVALIDATION
The goal of these methods is to find and invalidate dangling pointers during the runtime.
FreeSentry [2] , DangNULL [3] , and DangSan [19] track operations related to pointers, and analyze the relationships between objects and the pointers related to them. The relationships are usually recorded in some data structures. When an object is freed, all pointers related to this freed object will be found from the data structures, and then be invalidated. In DangNULL [3] , an RB-tree is used, with each node corresponding to an object, and holding in/out-bound pointers related to this object. In FreeSentry [2] , two lookup tables are used, with each item of one table recording the mapping of a pointer to objects, and each item of the other table recording the mapping of an object to pointers. In DangSan [19] , the maps are used, with each map recording the mapping of pointers to an object. Meanwhile, the logs are used to keep track of the pointer locations, and the logs are per-thread so as to improve the performance of multi-threaded programs. Compared to MPChecker, DangNULL cannot defend against dangling pointers which are on the stack or in global memory, while FreeSentry does not support multi-threaded programs. Moreover, all of the three methods cannot track the pointers that are copied in a type-unsafe way.
PSweeper [30] achieves concurrent pointer sweeping and object origin tracking to find dangling pointers, which improves the efficiency by sweeping all pointers in a concurrent thread. When a dangling pointer is dereferenced, developers can find the information of the use-after-free behavior by the help of object origin tracking, including where the dangling pointer is dereferenced, and how the object is allocated and freed. However, PSweeper also cannot track the pointers that are copied in a type-unsafe way.
Undangle [31] is a runtime dynamic analysis tool based on taint tracking. When the heap object is allocated, a unique label is assigned to the return value of the allocation function, and all propagation of this label is tracked by dynamic taint analysis. When this heap object is freed, the unsafe dangling pointer is found according to this label and its life cycle. This method can achieve higher coverage of pointer propagation than the methods based on pointers tracking [2] , [3] , [19] , but it brings much more significant cost due to the low performance of taint tracking.
DangDone [23] is a method that can mitigate dangling pointers by inserting an intermediate pointer between all one-level pointers and the corresponding object. When an object is freed, the intermediate pointer of this freed object is invalidated. Although DangDone has very low overhead, it can only defend against one-level dangling pointers that point to the starting address of the heap object.
C. POINTER DEREFERENCE CHECKING
There are also some methods that check whether a pointer is valid when it is dereferenced.
CETS [32] assigns a unique identifier for each object, while all pointers related to this object also keeps the same identifier. CETS invalidates the identifier of the object when it is freed. Moreover, the pointer dereference is considered legal only when the identifiers of this pointer and the related object are both valid and the same. However, there will be a certain rate of false positives because it is assumed in CETS that a pointer only points to the same object all the time.
A fat pointer is a pointer with the additional piece of metadata besides the address in memory. These methods replace some or all pointers with fat pointers which contain the metadata as an identifier. EffectiveSan [33] is a method based on the low-fat pointer that includes type metadata, which binds freed objects to a special type for differentially handling. Thus, it can prevent use-after-free exploits by detecting this special type of each object. CCured [34] is a dynamic checking method for C programs based on fat-pointer, which combines type inference and run-time checking to ensure type safety. However, CCured changes the memory layout of pointers, which inevitably bring the compatibility problem.
D. SAFE MEMORY ALLOCATORS
These methods focus on reducing the probability of revealing the exact location of the memory to be reused.
DieHard [8] and DieHarder [35] are memory allocators with an approximating infinite-sized heap, which randomize the position of the object on the heap. In this way, the probability of allocating an object on an exact memory location can be reduced. Archipelago [36] is based on DieHard, which compacts cold objects to reduces the use of physical memory.
AddressSanitizer [9] uses a quarantine pool with queuebased reuse order, which provides accurate use-after-free vulnerabilities detection by using shadow memory. However, AddressSanitizer does not track the reallocations of heap objects. If a heap object is reallocated, it will cause a false negative.
Cling [7] can prevent use-after-free exploits by only allowing the heap objects of the same type to reuse memory. However, it cannot guarantee the security of memory reuse between the same type.
Guarder [37] is a customizable allocator by allowing users to specify their desired security guarantee, which randomly picks up an object from an allocation buffer. Guarder increases the randomization of allocation by randomly picking up one from 2 E (E is the desired entropy) objects for each allocation request.
However, attackers can still bypass these safe memory allocators through certain techniques, such as heap-spraying [10] and Heap Feng Shui [11] .
Dhurjati and Adve [38] propose a method that gives each new object a new virtual page, which can prevent pointers related to a freed object from being dereferenced to this new object, thus avoiding the exploit to dangling pointers. Moreover, different virtual pages can be mapped to the same physical page to economize memory usage. Inspired by the core ideas of the method [38] , Oscar [24] presents an optimized page-permissions-based method to defend against dangling pointers. Oscar does not need the source code, and also can support fork(), which makes this method more practical. However, there is significant overhead when there are large-scale allocations and deallocations in the program because these methods make each function call of malloc()/free() as a system call.
E. LIMITING THE DAMAGE FROM EXPLOITS
As discussed in Section I, use-after-free vulnerabilities can result in information leakage and arbitrary code execution. The methods such as control flow integrity (CFI) and virtual table hijacking protection can prevent control flow hijacking to limit the damage from arbitrary code execution caused by use-after-free exploits.
Practical CFI methods, such as CCFIR [15] , bin-CFI [16] , are usually coarse-grained, which makes some control flows exploitable [17] , [18] . CCFIR [15] makes all legal targets of indirect control-transfer instructions as a set, and limits indirect transfers to only flow to this set. In bin-CFI [16] , all possible indirect control-flow targets are analyzed, and indirect control-flow transfers are limit to these targets. SafeDispatch [13] inserts runtime checks to ensure that control flows at virtual methods cannot be arbitrarily modified. Vtpin [14] updates the VTable pointer with the address of a safe VTable after every object deallocation. These two methods only focus on control flow hijackings that aim at VTable pointers. In general, both of the control flow integrity and virtual table hijacking protection methods cannot defend against information leakage caused by dangling pointers.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a dynamic defense system, MPChecker, for preventing against use-after-free exploits, which is based on multi-level pointers by inserting intermediate pointers between a heap object and its related pointers. The operations that are related to the object and its related pointers are instrumented and replaced with a secured version in a selfimplemented library during LLVM compilation. Through the functionalities provided in this library, the intermediate pointers are dynamically generated during runtime by tracking the this objects and its related pointers. Then, all of the accesses to the object to be protected via its related pointers can only be achieved through the intermediate pointers. Thus, dangling pointers that point to the freed object's address range can be prevented from being dereferenced, by invalidating all intermediate pointers related to this object after it is freed. Compared to the related methods, MPChecker can track pointers that are copied in a type-unsafe way including memory copy functions and the type-unsafe conversions. In addition, it can also track the pointers located on the whole memory including the stack, the heap, and global memory, rather than only on the heap. Thus, MPChecker can provide higher security for protecting heap objects from being accessed via dangling pointers. Moreover, the security and performance evaluations show MPChecker is effective and comparably efficient. 
